john hawks weblog

paleoanthropology, genetics and evolution

species

  • Is the Biological Species Concept a "minority view"?

    Mon, 2011-02-07 17:25 -- John Hawks

    Last week, Science ran a couple of items by Ann Gibbons that give further perspective on the discoveries last year that Neandertals and Denisovans both contributed to the ancestry of recent human populations. The sidebar piece, titled, "The species problem," raises the taxonomic question:

    Our ancestors had sex with at least two kinds of archaic humans at two different times and places—and those liaisons produced surviving children, according to the latest ancient DNA research (see main text, p. 392). But were the participants in these prehistoric encounters members of separate species? Doesn't a species, by definition, breed only with others of that species?

    I get the most awesome quote in the short article, because I get to defend the Biological Species Concept!

    Gibbons describes this as a "minority view among paleoanthropologists." I can't disagree: Get a dozen paleoanthropologists in a room, and I bet only 1 or 2 will seriously propose that we could apply BSC to hominins.

    This would be sort of understandable, if we were limited to the evidence of 15 years ago, with no genetics. It just wasn't really possible to test the hypothesis of interbreeding among populations, not at the scale at which we can today. There was always skeletal evidence that suggested Neandertals had contributed to later populations, as many of us pointed out repeatedly. But it was hard to quantify the phenomenon, and without quantification, it was possible for people to argue that interbreeding had been "evolutionarily insignificant".

    Paleoanthropologists have instead held species concepts that did not use interbreeding as a primary criterion. Many adopted Cracraft's Phylogenetic Species Concept, or Wiley's treatment of Simpson's Evolutionary Species Concept. Both of these define species in terms of morphological characters visible to the systematist, although they differ with respect to the pattern that justifies recognizing a species.

    Much of this is just ridiculous now. Genetic evidence shows a substantial amount of interbreeding between these Pleistocene groups. Lots of living humans trace more than a couple of percent of their genomes from some ancient non-African population; some may derive more than 8 percent of their ancestry from such populations. That's not rare hybridization. With this kind of evidence, we can apply the BSC.

    One hangup: maybe we can't prove that our Neandertal ancestors contributed genes in proportion to their population numbers. Maybe a large fraction of their genes had a fitness disadvantage in the later population. But this is a hypothesis, not a fact. Any estimate of the fitness of Neandertals in mating with their non-Neandertal contemporaries has to take account of the demographic growth of later populations, including selection on new gene variants. We know for a fact that some Neandertal genes are today very common -- for example, one 100-kilobase region occurs at a frequency of 28 percent outside of Africa. Any assignment to a species is a hypothesis, provisional on finding new facts to refute it. For the moment the facts point to them being the same species as us.

    What do we do with a population like the Neandertals, or the Denisovans? Each was more genetically distant from the average living human than members of living populations are from each other. Each evolved during a long period of isolation or strongly restricted gene flow from each other and from sub-Saharan Africans. Still, the level of genetic difference among these populations was comparable or less than that separating populations of great apes that historically have been recognized as subspecies. So that's what I would call them. Subspecies of Homo sapiens.

    As a postscript, I think that whoever came up with the idea of "Denisovans" as a population name has done us a tremendous favor. The great benefit of the name, "Neandertals", is that we could talk about them without trotting out a taxonomic name. Now we have something similar in eastern Eurasia.

    Also Jerry Coyne, coauthor of Speciation, discusses the issue.

    Synopsis: 
    After Neandertal genes are found in us, I find myself defending the obvious idea that they're Homo sapiens.
  • Species concept overview

    Thu, 2010-10-21 08:30 -- John Hawks

    John Wilkins is an expert on species concepts in biology; he has written a short piece for wide circulation on the topic which is archived at his blog: "How many species concepts are there?" I just lectured on that topic in my introductory course, and it's good to have such an accessible introduction to the topic. In this case, Wilkins focuses on the philosophy -- why are there different concepts, and what do we mean when we say that?

  • Weidenreich on species

    Fri, 2008-10-17 15:36 -- John Hawks

    Franz Weidenreich, in his 1945 article, "The Puzzle of Pithecanthropus":

    It has become almost a rule in paleoanthropology that when a new hominid type is recovered scarcely one is proclaimed as lying in the line which leads to modern man. The type is usually held to be a representative of an extinct side-branch with no bearing on the problem of the ancestry of "Homo sapiens." I do not share this prejudice. As I have repeatedly shown elsewhere there is not the slightest justification for all those claims. They are completely arbitrary and based on purely subjective impressions. We do not know of any morphological criterion which testifies the generic specificity of any hominid form which, so far, has come to light.

  • Introgression, Neandertals, and species concepts

    Sun, 2006-11-12 22:37 -- John Hawks

    A key issue (at least for some paleo folks) is whether the term "introgression" gives aid and comfort to the idea that Neandertals were a distinct species from us. To the extent that we rely on hybrid zones to account for the interaction, it sure looks like we are talking about the interaction of different species. If we are really talking about subspecific interactions, then we shouldn't really be using the term "hybrid".

    Even Wikipedia describes introgression as the movement of a gene "from one species into the gene pool of another" by backcrossing.

    Now, what do we know about whether Neandertals and modern humans were different species?

    1. Speciation in primates, from commencement of prezygotic isolation to full postzygotic isolation, has taken between 1 and 4 million years to occur, considering pairs of living primate sister taxa (Curnoe et al. 2006).
    2. Mitochondrial DNA suggests that modern humans and Neandertals derived from a single ancestral population at most 250,000 - 500,000 years ago (the population divergence time consistent with a 350,000 - 700,000 year genetic divergence).
    3. Craniometrics suggest that Neandertals and modern humans were more different than many primate subspecies pairs (Harvati et al. 2004).
    4. Nonmetrics suggest that archaic Homo populations were no more genetically differentiated than human races (Hawks and Wolpoff 2001).
    5. Early Upper Paleolithic Europeans had a relatively high proportion of traits otherwise common in Neandertals.

    I could go on with a few more, but you get the point: Despite their morphological idiosyncracy, genes and comparisons with other primates reject the hypothesis that modern humans and Neandertals were reproductively isolated. In that context, the morphological differences among archaic humans are (presumably) largely adaptive, and the reason that modern humans don't look like archaic humans is a matter of their different adaptations.

    But if we aren't talking about different species of Homo, at least not in the sense of complete reproductive isolation, then why are we talking about introgression?

    The thing is, introgression and species boundaries have emerged as different problems in the literature on genetics and biogeography.

    For example, here's a passage from Dowling and Secor's (1997) review of introgression in animals:

    Hybridization is defined as "the interbreeding of individuals from two populations, or groups of populations, which are distinguishable on the basis of one or more heritable characters" (Harrison et al. 1993, p. 5), and introgression is "the permanent incorporation of genes from one set of differentiated populations into another, i.e., the incorporation of alien genes into a new, reproductively integrated population system" (Rieseberg and Wendel 1993, p. 71) (Dowling and Secor 1997:595).

    It is worth noting that this definition involves populations that could be defined as phylogenetic species -- populations differentiated by at least one morphological character. Of course, phylogenetic species are not evolutionary or biological species, but concerning the definition of fossil taxa like Neandertals, this is precisely the point at issue!

    Another passage from Rhymer and Simberloff (1996:84) approaches the question from the standpoint of conservation genetics:

    We define "hybridization" as interbreeding of individuals from what are believed to be genetically distinct populations, regardless of the taxonomic status of such populations. "Hybridization" most commonly refers to mating by heterospecific individuals but has been applied to mating by individuals of different subspecies and even of populations that, though not taxonomically distinguished, differ genetically. Arnold et al. (1991) suggest restricting "hybrid" to matings between species and using "intergrade" for matings between subspecies and "cross" or "interbreed" for matings between individuals of geographically distinct populations. Although such distinctions might clarify future discussions, all these terms seem so widely used in the literature for matings at every taxonomic level that they are unlikely to be restricted. Instead one must depend on accurate taxonomic description of the entities between which mating occurs.

    Introgression is gene flow between populations whose individuals hybridize, achieved when hybrids backcross to one or both parental populations. Beyond F1 hybrids, the point at which an individual is no longer viewed as a hybrid but rather as a member of one of the parental populations that has undergone introgression is arbitrary. A hybrid swarm is a population of individuals in which introgression has occurred to various degrees by varying numbers of generations of backcrossing to one or both parental taxa, in addition to mating among the hybrid individuals themselves. Hybridization need not be accompanied by introgression; for example, offspring of hybrid matings might all be sterile. Introgression can be unidirectional, with backcrossing to one parental population only (Rhymer and Simberloff 1996:84, citations omitted).

    From these passages, it becomes clear why "introgression" is used so broadly: Biologists still don't agree on what constitutes a species! This should be no surprise -- the species problem is one of the fundamental issues in biology. But it is useful to remember that fossil species are not an exceptional case.

    The problem is not with defining "hybrid" or "introgression." The problem is with defining species.

    The different definitions of the term "hybrid" evident in those passages also carry a lot of baggage. For the conservation geneticist, "hybridization" may mean something more or less undesirable -- something that ought to be avoided. From the point of view of defining species, "hybridization" ought to be unusual -- out of the ordinary. From the point of view of evolutionary genetics, "hybridization" may just mean reticulation -- a process making it possible for genes to move between populations that are more or less isolated. It is not just very common to talk about trans-subspecies matings as "hybridization" -- it is ubiquitous.

    And for that matter, the classical genetics definition of "hybrid" has nothing whatever to do with species. Remember hybrid corn? Mendel's peas? Hybridization is about crossing lines maintained by selection. And lest we forget the etymology of "hybrid", the original Latin hybrida was the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar. In other words, all this disagreement about the relevant taxonomic level for "hybridization" is highly subject-specific, and emerges from the conservation literature rather than from genetic principles.

    I would make two observations. First, the threshold for "introgression" is arbitrary. For example, Ellstrand et al. (1999) define "introgression" as the gene flow between taxa (implying species), but discuss it mainly in connection with introgression from domesticated to wild plants, where the "species" distinction is based on the history of domestication. In the conservation literature, "introgression" concerns the detection of "alien genes", largely from invasive or cosmopolitan species (e.g., mallard genes entering American black duck populations). In the last several years of journals like Molecular Ecology there have been one or two papers per issue dealing with introgression between natural populations of animals -- mainly documenting the apparent movement of alleles between classical subspecies and morphospecies.

    References to introgression are accelerating in part because of the prominent role of mitochondrial systematics in the 1990's -- people are discovering that mtDNA phylogenies don't tell the whole story of gene flow between wild populations. This is no surprise at all from an evolutionary perspective, but it has pretty clear application to the systematics of Homo, where much (so far) has ridden on the proposition that mtDNA is an accurate guide to population histories.

    My second observation is that the movement of adaptive alleles from one population to another is especially likely to take the form of introgression. Genes under selection doesn't respond to population boundaries in the same way as neutral genes. The way that most people have framed the issue of the archaic-modern transition is in terms of neutral genes and population movements. But this is a poor model for the behavior of adaptive genes. This means that most people's notion of ancient population dynamics is different from the expectations of population genetics. Like the problem defining "hybrids", the mismatch of models and theory is deeply rooted in the species problem: If you think Neandertals were a different "species" from moderns, then you probably think it must follow that there was no "important" genetic interaction between the two populations.

    Genetics over the past couple of decades has shown that species "boundaries" are permeable, that postzygotic isolation in mammals takes millions of years, that the flow of adaptive alleles across species boundaries in mammals is ubiquitous, and that reticulate evolution between mammalian genera is far from rare.

    We could just conclude (as some of my readers have) that biology just got the species problem "wrong", and that we should be talking about subspecies instead of species. Maybe we should limit species to "really, really" isolated populations, or populations that "diverged at least 4.5 million years ago", or some other metric. There may be a lot of truth in that, but if wolves and coyotes are subspecies, cattle and bison are subspecies, and all baboons are subspecies, then I think we have to abandon the idea that species are a meaningful unit of adaptation! More to the point, most biologists use subspecies to mean "allopatric", or at least "peripatric" populations, yet hybridization and introgression commonly occur among sympatric (yet partially isolated) populations.

    (UPDATE: A reader let me know that it sounds like I am actually proposing that wolves and coyotes are subspecies here. Quite the opposite -- wolves and coyotes are good species for reasons of their clear adaptive differences in sympatry. My -- possibly botched -- point is that the problem is not that the species concept is wrongly applied here; the problem is that the correct application of the species concept still gives us species that interbreed a lot! If you try to fix the problem by applying a different species concept, then we end up with a lot of very strange looking "subspecies".)

    I take a different tack. There will never be any tidy solution to the species problem, because all species have unique evolutionary histories and constraints. Given these difficulties, the species status of archaic Homo populations is basically an intractable problem. That is, I am happy to suggest that archaic Homo populations correspond to classical subspecies, and as far as I know, no evidence strongly contradicts that position. But I can recognize that some people will never agree with this assignment. And from the perspective of their evolution, it just doesn't matter. Evolutionarily important gene flow occurs between mammal species, subspecies, and populations.

    As you can probably tell, I have become greatly disgusted by the species problem. My reasons for this extend beyond the present discussion, but in any event I think it is a hopeless task to build any kind of consensus about the nature of fossil species.

    So we have to begin by identifying patterns of interaction and gene flow. Introgressive gene flow is then a category of gene flow between differentiated populations. In particular, introgression is extensive (as opposed to merely local) and permanent (as opposed to ephemeral). Because of this, the pattern of introgression is fairly likely to involve adaptive alleles, but it need not do so. However, a widespread signature of interbreeding in neutral (or even deleterious) alleles is very likely to reflect a higher level of gene flow than would usually be indicated by "introgression". Is this a distinction without a difference? I think it's a pattern, and one that has now been replicated by several genes. It remains to be seen if it is the dominant pattern, or whether a broader pattern of genetic similarities will emerge -- but keep in mind that I think another pattern is also at play that will help to explain much.

    Finding evidence for introgression in genes like MCPH1 is basically the operational procedure by which people are now looking for introgression in natural populations -- with one exception: for extant populations, we can test the genes of both populations directly. For extinct archaic populations, we can have evidence of introgression only by inference, which means that we will likely miss many true instances of gene flow from archaic humans. This does raise the risk of valuing "introgression" more substantially than it may "deserve" -- in particular, that adaptive alleles like MCPH1 will get a lot more attention than other genes that may have more ambiguity.

    But I think that evidence of introgression reinforces the hypothesis that modern humans emerged in an adaptive context, making use of adaptive variation from a widespread (possibly pan-Old-World) population of archaic Homo. It's one of the two main patterns in the evolution of modern humans.

    References:

    Harrison RG. 1993. Hybrids and hybrid zones: historical perspective. In: Hybrid zones and the evolutionary process, ed. Harrison RG. pp. 3-12. Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.

    Rieseberg LH, Wendel JF. 1993. Introgression and its consequences in plants. In: Hybrid zones and the evolutionary process, ed. Harrison RG. pp. 70-109. Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.

    Dowling TE, Secor CL. 1997. The role of hybridization and introgression in the diversification of animals. Ann Rev Ecol Systemat 28:593-619.

    Ellstrand NC, Prentice HC, Hancock JF. 1999. Gene flow and introgression from domesticated plants into their wild relatives. Ann Rev Ecol Systemat 30:539-563.

    Rhymer JM, Simberloff D. 1996. Extinction by hybridization and introgression. Ann Rev Ecol Systemat 27:83-109.

    Synopsis: 
    I don't view Neandertals as a distinct species, yet still think "introgression" is a useful way to refer to gene flow from them into recent humans.
  • Species concepts

    Tue, 2005-02-08 22:34 -- John Hawks

    A new population that results from a speciation event is called a species. But although species result from a simple process, recognizing species in nature can be complicated. Biologists cannot travel in time to observe the speciations that resulted in today's diversity of life, so they must observe the reproduction of living organisms to determine the makeup of species. Paleontologists can find the fossil evidence of the ancestors of today's species, but they cannot observe whether those fossil organisms could reproduce with each other. Because scientists have different kinds of evidence about organisms, they use different concepts of species when testing hypotheses about their evolution.

    Biological species

    The most obvious property that helps to define species is reproductive isolation. Biologists studying living animals often use the biological species concept, which envisions a species as a "group of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations which are reproductively isolated from other such groups" (Mayr 1942). It is the biological species concept that primatologists use to grapple with whether chimpanzees and bonobos are different species, for example, by observing the differences in their reproductive behaviors and the strength of geographic isolation between their populations.

    The biological species concept has some important limitations for paleontology. Making use of the concept depends on observing the mating behavior and interbreeding patterns of animals in their natural environments, which is not possible with fossils of organisms that lived in the past. Other kinds of observations that paleontologists might gather, such as morphological differences between fossils, have no necessary value under this concept. Another limitation is that the biological species concept does not incorporate any idea of how species may change over time. Paleontologists study fossils that may be separated by hundreds of thousands of years of time. It is difficult to imagine such widely separated individuals as part of the same reproductive community, even if they were very similar to each other. Over such time periods, evolution can transform populations substantially. The biological species concept recognizes the genetic continuity within a species caused by gene flow, but it does not incorporate a view of species existing over evolutionary time. For these reasons, paleontology requires a different kind of species concept.

    Phylogenetic species concept

    The phylogenetic species concept is an attempt to define species by their relationships to other species. Instead of trying to determine the reproductive boundaries of populations, scientists using the phylogenetic species concept attempt to uncover their genealogical relationships. A group of individuals that includes all the descendants of one common ancestor, leaving no descendants out, is called a monophyletic group.

    Paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Joel Cracraft devised a species concept called the "Phylogenetic Species Concept," intended to apply to circumstances in which reproduction or isolation among organisms could not be observed. Under this concept, a species is "a diagnosable cluster of individuals within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and escent, beyond which there is not, and which exhibits a pattern of phylogenetic ancestry and descent among units of like kind" (Eldredge and Cracraft 1980:92).

    Key to the phylogenetic species concept is the idea that species must be "diagnosable." In other words, members of the species should share a combination of characteristics that other species lack. To look for the unique features that define a phylogenetic species, paleontologists must perform systematic comparisons with other related fossils or living species. These aspects of the concept make it widely applicable in paleontology.

    But the phylogenetic species concept is not without its problems. Because the concept defines species based on morphology, without explicitly referring to populations or reproductive boundaries, it does not apply well to cases where morphologically different populations are connected by gene flow. Morphological variation among populations is not uncommon within living species. Humans today are a species with substantial morphological variation from continent to continent. Humans on different continents are not reproductively isolated, and their variation is largely distributed as clines over large geographic distances. Yet a paleontologist who had only a few fragmentary specimens from each continent would not necessarily know the pattern of variation, and many features of his specimens would appear to be unique. What would the paleontologist make of the high nose of a European specimen, the forward-facing cheeks of an Asian fossil, or the strong browridge above the eye orbits of an Australian, each taken randomly from their variable populations? By applying the phylogenetic species concept, a paleontologist would probably conclude that the different continents were homes to different human species.

    Thus, because the phylogenetic species concept does not identify species based on the reproductive boundaries between them, it may have the effect of identifying populations connected by gene flow as different species. For this reason, a phylogenetic species as defined by a paleontologist may not correspond to a real prehistoric population that was the product of a speciation. Some paleontologists do not view this potential conflict as a problem, because identifying species based on unique characteristics will create as full as possible a systematization of the evolution of new features. Assuming that the number of ancient species was very large, and the number of fossils representing each of them is very small, then paleontologists can hardly hope to identify every speciation event in the past. The phylogenetic species concept may therefore provide a better approximation of the number and diversity of species that existed than other alternatives.

    On the other hand, identifying populations connected by gene flow as different species can be a significant problem for paleontologists who take a greater interest in the processes of evolution than in the diversity of species in the past. Gene flow is a significant force shaping evolutionary change within populations. Moreover, evolution may cause a single species to change over time, possibly acquiring new unique features without any division of a species into separate reproductively isolated populations. Some paleontologists approach these difficulties by altering their view of the evolutionary process. If speciations can happen as a transformation of a single population in addition to the appearance of reproductive boundaries between populations, then a single evolving population may over time comprise several phylogenetic species. Or if most evolutionary change happened at the time of speciation, as asserted by the concept of punctuated equilibrium, then the phylogenetic species concept might more closely approximate the actual pattern of speciations in the past. But without such assumptions, the phylogenetic species concept's problems sometimes create a stumbling block for some paleontologists in attempting to understand the evolutionary process.

    Evolutionary species

    The evolutionary species concept combines the genealogical basis of the phylogenetic species concept with the genetic basis of the biological species concept. An evolutionary species is a lineage of interbreeding organisms, reproductively isolated from other lineages, that has a beginning, an end, and a distinct evolutionary trajectory (Wiley 1978). The beginning of a species' existence is a speciation, as a population becomes reproductively isolated from a parent population. The end of a species occurs either with extinction or with the branching of the species into one or more descendants.

    Central to the evolutionary species concept is the idea of an evolutionary trajectory. The trajectory of a species is the evolutionary pattern of its characteristics over time. For example, one of the earliest species in the story of human evolution, Australopithecus afarensis, is represented by dozens of fossil teeth and mandibles, as well as other remains. Paleontologists hypothesize that these fossils, from several sites in East Africa, are members of a single species because of their many morphological resemblances. No very similar fossils have ever been found before 3.6 million or after 3 million years ago, dates that appear to indicate the beginning and the end of the species.

    Nevertheless, the fossils do show some differences that appear over time. Although the molar teeth of the fossils do not change over time, the mandibles are thicker and more massive in more recent fossils than in the most ancient ones. As far as paleontologists can test, the mandibles form a single series evolving over time toward greater size and thickness. The evolutionary species concept infers that the fossils represent a species, beginning 3.6 million years ago and ending 3 million years ago, with an evolutionary trajectory that includes the evolution of greater mandibular thickness, without apparent changes in molar sizes.

    The strength of the evolutionary species concept is that it allows paleontologists to focus on the causes of evolutionary change, whether they occur during speciations or at other times. Regarding A. afarensis, the observation that mandibles increased in size during the existence of the species may be explained by different evolutionary forces and conditions than if all the change occurred with the reproductive isolation of a new population. Although the greater mandibular thickness of later mandibles might be a unique feature, attempting to establish a new phylogenetic species for the later fossils might detract from an explanation of the overall evolutionary pattern.

    Phylogenetic species vs. evolutionary species concepts

    But the evolutionary species concept also has its problems. Because it uses several different criteria, much more information may be necessary to define an evolutionary species. Some scientists do not view this as a drawback, since even if a scientific view of the species that once existed and their boundaries and relationships proves a challenge, it may nevertheless add to our understanding of the evolutionary process.

    Yet for many paleontologists, the need to amass great numbers of fossils from different times makes the evolutionary species concept nearly impossible to implement. At the same time, if scientists always hold out the possibility that two different fossils were actually connected by gene flow, it may impede an understanding of evolutionary changes that accompany the appearance of new reproductively isolated species. If we want to have a scientific, meaning falsificationist, view of the species that have existed and their boundaries and relationships to each other, we must accept that the process will in many cases be difficult. Simply making up many species hypotheses cannot add to our knowledgeÑand in many cases it may detract. What is important is that we realize that our record of past species is incomplete, and our failure to substantiate the existence of many species in the past does not constitute evidence that they did not exist.

    Testing species hypotheses

    However species are defined, whenever scientists identify a species, they actually are stating a hypothesis about the relationships among individual organisms. Such a hypothesis may be tested using morphological, genetic, or behavioral evidence. Discovering real species that existed in the past involves predicting the morphological variability of populations, including variation that occurs among populations connected by gene flow. In the relatively small fossil samples available to paleontologists, determining the number of species in a sample is a significant problem. Researchers use a number of techniques to test species hypotheses with limited morphological samples.

    Two fossil hominids: different species or not?

    1. What is the level of morphological difference between two or more specimens? Using a living species for comparison, scientists can determine the likelihood of sampling similar variability as the fossil sample (Miller 2000).
    2. What are the relative frequencies of characteristics in two samples of fossils? Statistical comparison with the differences between different populations within a living species can determine whether the differences in frequencies observed in the fossils would be likely to occur within the comparison species. Such comparisons can be extended to the differences between the sexes of a living species to test whether sexual dimorphism accounts for differences between fossils (Lee 1999).
    3. How do morphological features covary? If one fossil sample has a high incidence of several features that are absent or at low frequency in another sample, this supports the hypothesis that the two samples represent different species. With samples of sufficient size, say, 10 individuals or more, paleontologists can even estimate the maximum level of gene flow consistent with the morphological differences, and thereby frame a test of the hypothesis of different species in solid evolutionary terms (Hawks and Wolpoff 2001).
    4. Do samples represent change over time? Sometimes paleontologists can use different populations from living species to evaluate likelihood that certain kinds of changes might occur over time. The best comparisons are with large samples of fossils that represent long spans of time, however. Although the evolutionary process is in ways unique for each species, analyses of the rate and level of changes in other species provide the most powerful tests of species hypotheses available in studying the past.

    References:

    Eldredge N, Cracraft J. 1980. Phylogenetic patterns and the evolutionary process: Method and theory in comparative biology. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Hawks J, Wolpoff MH. 2001. The accretion model of Neandertal evolution. Evolution 55:1474-1485.
    PubMed

    Lee SH. 1999. Evolution of human sexual dimorphism: Using assigned resampling method to estimate sexual dimorphism when individual sex is unknown. Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan.

    Mayr E. 1942. Systematics and the origin of species from the viewpoint of a zoologist. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Miller JMA. 2000. Craniofacial variation in Homo habilis: An analysis of the evidence for multiple species. Am J Phys Anthropol 112:103-128.
    PubMed

    Wiley EO. 1978. The evolutionary species concept reconsidered. Syst Zool 27:17-26.

    Synopsis: 
    Material outlining biological, phylogenetic and evolutionary species concepts, from the blog's first year.
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Neandertals

For years, I've worked on their bones. Now I'm working on their genes. Read more about the science studying these ancient people.

Denisova

From a finger bone of an ancient human came the record of a completely unexpected population. My lab is working on the science of the Denisova genome.

Acceleration

The advent of agriculture caused natural selection to speed up greatly in humans. We're uncovering some of the ways that populations have rapidly changed during the last 10,000 years.

Malapa

Just outside Johannesburg, the Malapa site is producing some of the most exciting finds in human evolution. This site is the headquarters of the Malapa Soft Tissue Project.