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paleoanthropology, genetics and evolution

future

  • Turning eyes toward the future

    Fri, 2013-04-26 09:52 -- John Hawks

    The Guardian covers a story on risks to humanity: "How are humans going to become extinct?" The occasion for the story seems to be Cambridge University's desire to have a parallel to Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute:

    The Future of Humanity project at Oxford is part of a trend towards focusing research on such big questions. The institute was launched by the Oxford Martin School, which brings together academics from across different fields with the aim of tackling the most "pressing global challenges".

    There are also ambitions at Cambridge University to investigate such threats to humanity.

    Lord Rees, the Astronomer Royal and former president of the Royal Society, is backing plans for a Centre for the Study of Existential Risk.

    "This is the first century in the world's history when the biggest threat is from humanity," says Lord Rees.

    I'm thinking quite a lot about how to present future visions of humanity, as this is a big part of my MOOC course. The tough part about a critical view of developing technologies is that the critics are rarely well-versed in the technical details, therefore they focus too intently on unrealistic or unachievable outcomes. But then, the forefront of technical innovation is so often led by young researchers who aren't deeply buried in the midden of scientific societies. Do institutes like this make a difference? Or are they (as some critics of NIH big project science point out) simply full employment schemes for ethicists?

    Whichever is the case, studying the human future should involve a much deeper perspective on human evolution, and a solid grasp of evolutionary processes. That's what I'm working to build.

  • A future beneath the yellow sky

    Mon, 2013-04-22 22:43 -- John Hawks

    Why am I linking this story in the NY Times about the extreme levels of pollution in Beijing? ("Pollution Is Radically Changing Childhood in China’s Cities")

    Levels of deadly pollutants up to 40 times the recommended exposure limit in Beijing and other cities have struck fear into parents and led them to take steps that are radically altering the nature of urban life for their children.

    Parents are confining sons and daughters to their homes, even if it means keeping them away from friends. Schools are canceling outdoor activities and field trips. Parents with means are choosing schools based on air-filtration systems, and some international schools have built gigantic, futuristic-looking domes over sports fields to ensure healthy breathing.

    ...because indoor pollution (from cooking fires) has already been a selection pressure on many human populations, including some high-altitude populations where hypoxia combines with carbon monoxide. It is one thing to think about the future of human adaptation to extremes in space, or extreme lifespan, or genetic engineering. It is another thing entirely to see the future of some parts of the world as an exaggerated version of the Industrial Revolution, childhoods of deepening smog.

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  • Our future shrinking population

    Fri, 2013-01-11 00:48 -- John Hawks

    Jeff Wise in Slate has an essay about "World population may actually start declining, not exploding".

    A somewhat more arcane milestone, meanwhile, generated no media coverage at all: It took humankind 13 years to add its 7 billionth. That’s longer than the 12 years it took to add the 6 billionth—the first time in human history that interval had grown. (The 2 billionth, 3 billionth, 4 billionth, and 5 billionth took 123, 33, 14, and 13 years, respectively.) In other words, the rate of global population growth has slowed. And it’s expected to keep slowing. Indeed, according to experts’ best estimates, the total population of Earth will stop growing within the lifespan of people alive today.

    In other words, the global population has crossed the zero point of the Great Second Derivative of population growth. This is not news as UN and other projections have long predicted a "hump" in human population during the next century, but the article goes to an extreme: What if, once it stops growing and begins shrinking, the human population shrinks down to some very small number?

    That might sound like an outrageous claim, but it comes down to simple math. According to a 2008 IIASA report, if the world stabilizes at a total fertility rate of 1.5—where Europe is today—then by 2200 the global population will fall to half of what it is today. By 2300, it’ll barely scratch 1 billion. (The authors of the report tell me that in the years since the initial publication, some details have changed—Europe’s population is falling faster than was previously anticipated, while Africa’s birthrate is declining more slowly—but the overall outlook is the same.) Extend the trend line, and within a few dozen generations you’re talking about a global population small enough to fit in a nursing home.

    Notice how so many people who comment on the global population assume that human growth is a homogeneous process? That is, they understand that nations presently have different rates of growth, but conceive of them as being at different places in a process of Westernization. They treat the nations themselves as homogeneous entities.

    That's not the right way to think about the future. We have heterogeneous national populations, with subgroups that have very high fertility rates. The largest contrast in terms of proportion of the population in most countries is rural/urban, where rural people have larger family sizes than city-dwellers. One of the biggest contributors to the decline in population growth has been urbanization, as city-dwellers tend to have kids later and have fewer of them. So as the populations of most countries make the transition to urban majorities, their growth rate slows.

    There are many other factors, some cultural and others more broadly environmental. Religion is a key factor, and countries with diverse religious populations, like the U.S., have large variance in family sizes among different religious groups. The effect of religion on family size isn't absolute, as urbanization, education, and economic constraints lead to lower family sizes even among religious groups that encourage a "quiver-full" family size. However, I suspect that the variance among cultural groups within countries will persist, and that persistence in the face of a global reduction in growth will tend to increase the proportion of the population represented by fast-growing groups. As fast-growing groups increase in proportion, the overall growth rate of the population increases. So modeling a steady future decline in population assumes a uniform cultural effect on these heterogenous groups, which I doubt.

    I also consider it an open question whether family size will be positively selected moving forward in time. All else being equal, bigger families will represent more and more of the population, and any genes that correlate with larger family size will increase in numbers. At present, we are seeing the large effect of environmental factors on reducing family size, just as environmental factors during the last 200 years have massively increased survival within populations with large family sizes. But as we equalize the environment in various ways, any effect of genes will become relatively more important in their contribution to variance in family size.

    As Malcolm reminds us in Jurassic Park, "life finds a way"...

    Synopsis: 
    I gently question the assumptions underlying predictions of future population size
  • Martian will

    Wed, 2012-11-28 15:46 -- John Hawks

    Adam Mann in Wired covers Elon Musk's ideas about putting people on Mars: "Elon Musk Wants to Build 80,000-Person Mars Colony".

    That first flight would be expensive and risky but “once there are regular Mars flights, you can get the cost down to half a million dollars for someone to move to Mars,” Musk told Space.com. ”Then I think there are enough people who would buy that to have it be a reasonable business case.” Musk added that he sees the future 80,000-person colony as a public-private enterprise costing roughly $36 billion.

    I'm right now finishing an essay about the constraints on human colonization of space, so to see this topic developing in the news again is a good thing.

  • Interstellar design

    Sat, 2012-09-22 11:08 -- John Hawks

    Popular Mechanics has an article that goes through some of the basics of space flight design principles: "What would a starship actually look like?"

    One look at the Icarus design—or its predecessor, the Daedalus—and it’s clear what starships don’t need: wings. The only real-world spacecraft that bother with wings are ones designed to make regular landings on runways, such as the retired Space Shuttle, the upcoming Lynx (a suborbital two-seater from XCOR) or the Dream Chaser, an in-development orbital craft from Sierra Nevada. And wings aren’t even required for landings. Like the Russian Soyuz capsule, SpaceX’s Dragon currently splashes down in the ocean (though SpaceX plans to move toward rocket-powered launchpad landings).

    In both the near and far-term future, experts such as Millis imagine interstellar vessels won’t spend much of their time in an atmosphere. Perhaps the small ships that carry people from surface to starship will remain winged, but truly interstellar vehicles can scrap aerodynamics and all of the design principles that are beholden to reducing wind resistance.

    I got to spend a little time sitting in the Lynx prototype last fall, and I have to say it was pretty awesome.

    Of course the large ships that would be capable of interplanetary or interstellar voyages have very different design requirements than something meant to land on Earth. My interest in these is broader than aeronautical design: What are the human requirements of sustaining a population for dozens or hundreds of years?

  • Mailbag: Beyond the solar system

    Wed, 2012-03-28 19:28 -- John Hawks

    My name is Corey Hayes. I am in my final year of Anthropology at MacEwan University in Edmonton, Canada. My Minor's English, and I've been told I have a bent for creative writing, specifically, sci-fi.

    A few summers ago I wrote an article in response to Stephen Hawking's warning that humans might go extinct if we didn't migrate into space. I argued that even if we did migrate to other worlds, we would eventually still go extinct (by ceasing to be Homo sapiens, which you spoke of in National Geographic). I then began to speculate on the directions evolution might take us if, as you so brilliantly put it, "Some major new isolating mechanism" takes place.

    Suppose five arks head out in opposite directions (the Milky Way is about 100,000 light years in diameter), and those five populations (including Terran plants and animals) remain isolated from one another for hundreds of thousands, or millions of years, on a variety of planets (with different gravities, atmospheres, some with moons, some without, under reddish, bluish, or whitish suns) - would they, during a random encounter among the cosmos, and given the ample opportunities over such vast stretches of time for the loss of history to occur, even recognize one another?

    I reckon the DNA evidence would point to a common origin, and many phenotypical traits would be maintained. But I wonder whether linguistic commonalities could still exist along with cultural and ethical remnants. Or, if one population comes from a world illumined by a reddish sun, and another was illumined by a bluish, how might that complicate communication about, say, color? How might the absence of a moon, or the presence of two moons, affect menarche (though I understand that there is no scientific evidence the two are linked, the 28-day cycle is still a heck of a coincidence). How long would the populations have to be isolated for them to became separate species (or be unable to even breed hybrids)?

    I'm not necessarily asking you to answer these questions (but if you can, that would be great). But I would really appreciate it if you could point me in the direction of any relevant scholarly articles, essays, or even short stories you may have encountered that may help me answer these questions.

    And thanks for thinking ahead. I hope we make it there.

    Thanks for writing.

    One factor to consider is technology. Language change, for example, has really slowed since literacy became widespread; and the scope of nation-states with newspapers, magazines and radio and television have caused the disappearance or decline of many minority languages across the world. If the people who are part of some human diaspora live in habitats that are suffused with technology; computers designed and programmed on Earth, for example, they might continue their language and cultural evolution at a very slow pace -- at least relative to how human societies have changed during prehistory.

    I think the optimal population size for a diasporic group would be large enough to make drift negligible, even on the generation-ship timescale. Selection would kick in much more strongly when the groups reach their ultimate destinations. Then, anything goes.

  • Thinking about the dark days

    Sun, 2012-03-11 23:51 -- John Hawks

    When it comes to the long term future of humanity, I'm fundamentally an optimist. But The Atlantic has an interview with Nick Bostrom, director of Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute, who is a little more downbeat than me: "We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction".

    In one of your papers on this topic you note that experts have estimated our total existential risk for this century to be somewhere around 10-20%. I know I can't be alone in thinking that is high. What's driving that?

    Bostrom: I think what's driving it is the sense that humans are developing these very potent capabilities---we are doing unprecedented things, and there is a risk that something could go wrong. Even with nuclear weapons, if you rewind the tape you notice that it turned out that in order to make a nuclear weapon you had to have these very rare raw materials like highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which are very difficult to get. But suppose it had turned out that there was some technological technique that allowed you to make a nuclear weapon by baking sand in a microwave oven or something like that. If it had turned out that way then where would we be now? Presumably once that discovery had been made civilization would have been doomed.

    Some interesting passages later in the interview discuss machine intelligence and the Kardashev Scale.

  • Genomes too cheap to meter

    Wed, 2011-01-12 00:03 -- John Hawks

    Matthew Herper is a science and medicine contributing writer at Forbes.com. He has just written a series of posts themed as "Gene Week", focusing on advances in genomics. One of the most provocative, "Why You Can’t Have Your $1,000 Genome", focuses on the hidden costs of interpretation and high-coverage necessary for clinical use of genome data.

    His argument is that even if the cost of sequencing a low-coverage genome goes to $1000, the true cost of using the data will remain much higher:

    Great buzzword, but it may never happen, especially not any time soon and especially not at a cost of $1,000. Research costs for sequencing a human genome may drop that low very soon, but that doesn’t include paying the doctors or the cost of information technology to process the data. Research genomes are not accurate enough for medical use. Getting better accuracy requires sequencing the DNA more times, which drives the cost back up. I’d think if we’re talking about actual medical use, $10,000 is a more accurate number. Certainly, it is not going to drop below the $2,000 level for a magnetic resonance imaging scan. And once the technology is in use, I think it is possible that the costs will go back up.

    Daniel MacArthur replied to this argument, "Why you CAN have your $1000 genome - so long as you learn what to do with it".

    None of this is simple, but it will become easier with time. As the retail costs of sequencing drops, a substantial niche will develop for innovators providing affordable, intuitive, accurate interpretation tools (embryonic versions already exist: see, for instance, Promethease or Enlis Genomics). Open-source academic software built for large-scale sequencing projects will be adapted for use by non-specialists. The increasing availability of large-scale computing power (for instance, via Amazon EC2), coupled with this intuitive software, will make even compute-intensive analyses available to the educated, motivated lay-person.

    MacArthur sketches out a genome interpretation landscape in which professionals and tinkerers support a community of genome hobbyists. This landscape is already taking shape thanks to MacArthur and many others (even me), and it's a solid prediction that this kind of human genomics will become more and more important, using open access tools to investigate history and phenotype prediction.

    Herper has a reply and consideration of the two posts, Herper "Debating The $1,000 Genome". In it, he notes the comments of several professionals that the $1,000 number itself is not an important fact, it is the availability of sequencing within that order of magnitude.

    The inevitability of the $1000 genome has already made it irrelevant. We should expect a $1000 genome announcement this year. This will be hype, because the real $1000 genomes won't be here until...next year! Before the end of 2014, whole genome sequences at 4x coverage will cross the $100 mark. I think there's a good chance they will be less than $50 at that time.

    Based on numbers I've seen, those numbers are around six months optimistic. Geneticists are already planning projects anticipating $100 genomes -- some suggest that the next big project should be a "Million Genomes", because there isn't any sense bothering with a hundred thousand.

    It helps to realize what is driving the rapid reduction in price. The "next-gen" approaches have shared many basic assumptions (e.g., in situ amplification) but have not thus far been stymied by bottlenecks caused by patent overlaps because they have progressed along semi-independent pathways. As the technology moves to long single-strand approaches, multiple approaches still seem viable, although we are awaiting a solid demonstration of these methods at higher throughput. Price is not the only factor differentiating startups -- sequence quality and ease of sample prep are very important. But major research institutions justify new equipment by runtime and amortized acquisition costs, over years. A new sequencer needs to run enough this year not only to pay its overhead, but to pay the opportunity costs of a five-fold cheaper sequencer next year. As long as progress along multiple trajectories is possible, tech startups will continue the rapid reduction in per-genome price -- because price is the most visible way of differentiating their offerings and extending the sequencing market.

    This cannot continue indefinitely: at some point there may remain only one viable path to faster or cheaper sequencing. Or one company may be able to make startups more difficult by cornering the essential patents along multiple development trajectories.

    There are two fundamental questions:

    1. Where's the bottom? Cells replicate DNA fairly slowly, and they don't transmit the resulting data in a form that computers can read. Today, rapid sequencing depends on running massively parallel reactions, exploiting imaging electronics and computers and far from the limit of either (which themselves continue to increase in capacity subject to Moore's Law). We may be surprisingly close to a portable sequencing device the size and expense of a film camera.

    But the bottom of the market depends may depend less on supply and more on demand. Maybe human genomes will be clinical necessities, or maybe they will remain niche diagnostic data. In either case, there's an upper limit. We'll never need much more medical sequencing than we have people.

    Genomics cannot work on the microcomputer model. Computer companies sell new equipment to people and companies who already have lots of last-generation equipment. Genomics cannot work on that model: once you have your genome sequence in the cloud, you won't need it again. By itself, this business model stabilizes at fairly expensive prices. As long as you need to bill a technician and maintain highly regulated records, your service costs will be very high. That leaves little incentive for lowering the sequencing cost. It's like the genomics DMV -- when was the last time your state gave you a technology rebate on vehicle registration?

    Future cost reductions must depend on applications of massive sequencing in agriculture, genetic engineering and synthetic DNA. Those areas can support a different business model, one that can operate on an annual basis. They create potentially a much larger, decentralized global market, like the market that supported the development of microcomputers.

    The problem is developing the applied genetics -- the "killer app" to take advantage of the cheaper technology. And that brings us to...

    2. Where's the utility? The reduction in cost is happening despite the fact we don't really know why genomes will be useful. Both Herper and MacArthur agree that one obstacle to clinical use of genomic data will be annotating and interpreting the sequences. This problem generalizes to applications far beyond clinical contexts. How do we use genomes to do anything interesting or useful?

    At the margins, of course, we know what to do with a genome. Look for damaging mutations. This is a straightforward empirical challenge -- find out how alterations to particular nucleotides would affect phenotypes, both by themselves and in combination with common variants elsewhere in the genome. Annotation and interpretation will require us to have genomes from millions of people and expression data from hundreds of thousands of human tissue samples and animal models.

    Every other use of genomic information poses similar challenges. Do we want to use genomes to place individuals in a genealogical context? We need to work out the genealogical trees for loci genome-wide and find the historical causes for correlations within these trees. Want to use genomes to predict the response of old-growth forests to rainfall fluctuations? Testing 10,000 dead blackbirds for causal factors? Same story -- gene variants, microclimates, and functional networks.

    There will be an expensive, professional class of genome interpretation. In medicine, these will be clinicians or clinical assistants of some kind. In applied genetics, these will be research geneticists and postdocs. If you want a personalized genealogical consultation, a gut microbiome assessment of your beef cattle, or a read on that speck of black mildew in the basement, there will be a consultant for you. Like today's IT consultants, these genome consultants' knowledge, skills, and price structures will vary. They may offer knowledge of the latest discoveries, a crew of paid tinkerers, or the comfort of hand-holding, but mostly they're adding value to the software.

    Off-the-shelf software may always be a step behind the state of the art in genome interpretation, but it will always be cheap. Today you can compare your genome to cataloged SNP-phenotype associations for free, or you can pay $5 a month to 23andMe for a more user-friendly interface and non-expert information presentation. I expect HMO's to incorporate similar information applications as they embrace genomics, just as most are currently moving to patient-accessible charting software. Last year's research information will always be cheap, and for most purposes it will be good enough.

    Put these things together, and personal genomics today is where personal computing was in 1973. We haven't yet had an Altair, much less an Apple 2. But it's almost in reach. Quasi-professional hobbyists can cobble together data using primitive tools, and carry out the same analyses as postdocs. Sequencing costs falling by an order of magnitude every other year. The state of the art in interpretation totally free for the trained, with applied genomics and synthetic biology as growing industries. Genomes may not be literally too cheap to meter, but they'll certainly be, as George Church has suggested, free with additional purchase.

  • Quote: Boyle on progress

    Wed, 2010-11-10 21:12 -- John Hawks

    Alan Boyle:

    When it comes to scientific advances, the future is already here. It's just not evenly distributed yet.

    UPDATE (2010-11-12): A reader writes:

    I think Boyle is quoting William Gibson, who apparently said "The future is already here. It's just not evenly distributed yet" as far back as 1993, and continues to say so in interviews.

  • Clearing the stack

    Mon, 2010-01-25 22:56 -- John Hawks

    Here are some links that have been piling up in my browser tabs this week:

    NY Times: "Scientists Find a Shared Gene in Dogs With Compulsive Behavior"

    Afarensis links the Google Books archive of Darwinism Illustrated by George Romanes (1892).

    Julien Riel-Salvatore links a new paper on projectile point dynamics by the Mythbusters.

    In the arXiv: "To Understand Congress, Just Watch the Sandpile"

    It turns out that the way a particular resolution gains support can be accurately simulated by the avalanches that occur when grains of sand are dropped onto each other to form a pile.

    Gene Expression: "Rice, alcohol and genes" reviews evidence for the origin of an adaptive ADH1B variant in China.

    The Scholarly Kitchen: "Why Hasn’t Scientific Publishing Been Disrupted Already?"

    The Dynamist links to a a 1927 film review of Metropolis by author H. G. Wells. He didn't like the movie:

    Torches are Christian, we are asked to suppose; torches are human. Torches have hearts. But electric hand-lamps are wicked, mechanical, heartless things. The bad, bad inventor uses quite a big one.

    The Wall Street Journal says that fashion trends are out. Unless you count steampunk. Maybe it's all microtrends now.

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Neandertals

For years, I've worked on their bones. Now I'm working on their genes. Read more about the science studying these ancient people.

Denisova

From a finger bone of an ancient human came the record of a completely unexpected population. My lab is working on the science of the Denisova genome.

Acceleration

The advent of agriculture caused natural selection to speed up greatly in humans. We're uncovering some of the ways that populations have rapidly changed during the last 10,000 years.

Malapa

Just outside Johannesburg, the Malapa site is producing some of the most exciting finds in human evolution. This site is the headquarters of the Malapa Soft Tissue Project.